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 
Abstract— Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are increasingly 
being deployed in security-critical applications. Because of their 
inherent resource-constrained characteristics, they are prone to 
various security attacks, and a black hole attack is a type of attack 
that seriously affects data collection. To conquer that challenge, 
an active detection-based security and trust routing scheme 
named ActiveTrust is proposed for WSNs. The most important 
innovation of ActiveTrust is that it avoids black holes through the 
active creation of a number of detection routes to quickly detect 
and obtain nodal trust and thus improve the data route security. 
More importantly, the generation and distribution of detection 
routes are given in the ActiveTrust scheme, which can fully use 
the energy in non-hotspots to create as many detection routes as 
needed to achieve the desired security and energy efficiency. Both 
comprehensive theoretical analysis and experimental results 
indicate that the performance of the ActiveTrust scheme is better 
than that of previous studies. ActiveTrust can significantly 
improve the data route success probability and ability against 
black hole attacks and can optimize network lifetime.  
 
Index Terms—black hole attack, network lifetime, security, 
trust, wireless sensor networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IRELESS Sensor Networks (WSNs) are emerging as a 
promising technology because of their wide range of 
applications in industrial, environmental monitoring, 
military and civilian domains [1-5]. Due to economic 
considerations, the nodes are usually simple and low cost. They 
are often unattended, however, and are hence likely to suffer 
from different types of novel attacks [6-8]. A black hole attack 
(BLA) is one of the most typical attacks [9] and works as 
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follows. The adversary compromises a node and drops all 
packets that are routed via this node, resulting in sensitive data 
being discarded or unable to be forwarded to the sink. Because 
the network makes decisions depending on the nodes’ sensed 
data, the consequence is that the network will completely fail 
and, more seriously, make incorrect decisions [10-15]. 
Therefore, how to detect and avoid BLA is of great significance 
for security in WSNs. 
There is much research on black hole attacks [9, 16-19]. 
Such studies mainly focus on the strategy of avoiding black 
holes [17, 18, 19]. Another approach does not require black 
hole information in advance. In this approach, the packet is 
divided into M shares, which are sent to the sink via different 
routes (multi-path), but the packet can be resumed with T shares 
(T<=M). However, a deficiency is that the sink may receive 
more than the required T shares, thus leading to high energy 
consumption; such research can be seen in [9, 16]. Another 
preferred strategy that can improve route success probability is 
the trust route strategy. There is much related research, such as 
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The main feature is to create a route by 
selecting nodes with high trust because such nodes have a 
higher probability of routing successfully; thus, routes created 
in this manner can forward data to the sink with a higher 
success probability [22, 23]. 
However, the current trust-based route strategies face 
some challenging issues [24]. (1) The core of a trust route lies 
in obtaining trust. However, obtaining the trust of a node is very 
difficult, and how it can be done is still unclear. (2) Energy 
efficiency. Because energy is very limited in WSNs, in most 
research, the trust acquisition and diffusion have high energy 
consumption, which seriously affects the network lifetime. (3) 
Security. Because it is difficult to locate malicious nodes, the 
security route is still a challenging issue. Thus, there are still 
issues worthy of further study. Security and trust routing 
through an active detection route protocol is proposed in this 
paper. The main innovations are as follows. 
(1) The ActiveTrust scheme is the first routing scheme that 
uses active detection routing to address BLA. 
The most significant difference between ActiveTrust and 
previous research is that we create multiple detection routes in 
regions with residue energy; because the attacker is not aware 
of detection routes, it will attack these routes and, in so doing, 
be exposed. In this way, the attacker’s behavior and location, as 
well as nodal trust, can be obtained and used to avoid black 
holes when processing real data routes. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first proposed active detection 
mechanism in WSNs. 
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(2) The ActiveTrust route protocol has better energy 
efficiency.  
Energy is very precious in WSNs, and there will be more 
energy consumption if active detection is processed. Therefore, 
in previous research, it was impossible to imagine adopting 
such high-energy-consumption active detection routes. 
However, we find it possible after carefully analyzing the 
energy consumption in WSNs. Research has noted that there is 
still up to 90% residue energy in WSNs when the network has 
died due to the "energy hole" phenomenon. Therefore, the 
ActiveTrust scheme takes full advantage of the residue energy 
to create detection routes and attempts to decrease energy 
consumption in hotspots (to improve network lifetime). Those 
detection routes can detect the nodal trust without decreasing 
lifetime and thus improve the network security. According to 
theoretical analysis and experimental results, the energy 
efficiency of the ActiveTrust scheme is improved more than 2 
times compared to previous routing schemes, including shortest 
routing, multi-path routing. 
(3) The ActiveTrust scheme has better security 
performance. Compared with previous research, nodal trust can 
be obtained in ActiveTrust. The route is created by the 
following principle. First, choose nodes with high trust to avoid 
potential attack, and then route along a successful detection 
route. Through the above approach, the network security can be 
improved.  
(4) Through our extensive theoretical analysis and 
simulation study, the ActiveTrust routing scheme proposed in 
this paper can improve the success routing probability by 1.5 
times to 6 times and the energy efficiency by more than 2 times 
compared with that of previous researches. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
the related work is reviewed. The system model and problem 
statement are described in Section 3. In Section 4, the novel 
ActiveTrust scheme is presented. Security and performance 
analyses are provided in Section 5. Section 6 is the analysis and 
comparison of experimental results. We conclude in Section 7.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Single-path routing is a simple routing protocol [12] but is 
easily blocked by the attacker. Therefore, the most natural 
approach is via multi-path routing to the sink. Even if there is 
an attack in some route, the data can still safely reach the sink 
[9]. Multi-path routing protocols can be classified into two 
classes depending on whether the data packet is divided. One is 
multi-path routing without share division. The other is 
multi-path routing with share division, i.e., the packet is divided 
into shares, and different shares reach the destination via 
different routes [9]. 
(1) Non-share-based multi-path routing. There are 
different multi-path route construction methods. Ref. [25] 
proposes a multi dataflow topologies (MDT) approach to resist 
the selective forwarding attack. In the MDT approach, the 
network is divided into two dataflow topologies. Even if one 
topology has a malicious node, the sink can still obtain packets 
from the other topology. 
In such protocols, the deficiency is that if the packet is 
routed via n routes simultaneously, the energy consumption 
will be n times that of a single path route, which will seriously 
affect the network lifetime; similar research can be seen in 
multi-path DSR [25], the AOMDV [18] and AODMV [26].  
(2) Share-based multi-path routing protocols. The 
SPREAD algorithm in [27] is a typical share-based multi-path 
routing protocol. The basic idea of the SPREAD algorithm is to 
transform a secret message into multiple shares, which is called 
a (T, M) threshold secret sharing scheme [28]. The M shares are 
delivered by multiple independent paths to the sink such that, 
even if a small number of shares are dropped, the secret 
message as a whole can still be recovered [9, 16, 28]. The 
advantage of this algorithm is that through multi-path routing, 
each path routes only one share, and the attacker must capture 
at least T  shares to restore nodal information, which increases 
the attack difficulty [9]. Thus, the privacy and security can be 
improved. In the above research, the multi-path routing 
algorithms are deterministic such that the set of route paths is 
predefined under the same network topology [9]. This 
weakness opens the door for various attacks if the routing 
algorithm is obtained by the adversary [9]. 
For the weakness mentioned above, Ref. [29] proposed 
four random propagation strategies: random propagation (PRP), 
directed random propagation (DRP), non-repetitive random 
propagation (NRRP), and multicast tree assisted random 
propagation (MTRP). The general strategy is as follows. First, 
divide the message into M shares, and the route path of each 
share is not predetermined. Thus, even if the adversary acquires 
the routing algorithm, it is difficult to launch a pinpointed 
node-compromise or jamming attack. Because it is difficult to 
capture more than T  shares, the security is also improved. In 
multi-to-one data collection WSNs, we argue that for classic 
"slicing and assembling" or multi-path routing techniques, 
sliced shares will merge in the same path with high probability, 
and this path can be easily attacked by black holes. Thus, in 
[16], a Security- and Energy-efficient Disjoint Route (SEDR) 
scheme is proposed to route sliced shares to the sink with 
randomized disjoint multipath routes by utilizing the available 
surplus energy of sensor nodes. The authors demonstrate that 
the security is maximized without reducing the lifetime in the 
SEDR protocol.   
Another method to avoid attack and improve route success 
probability is trust routing. Trust management [20] is becoming 
a new driving force for solving challenges in ad hoc networks 
[21], peer-to-peer networks [22], and WSNs [23, 24].  
Zhan et al proposed a trust-aware routing framework 
protocol (TARF), using trust and energy cost for route 
decisions, to prevent malicious nodes from misleading network 
traffic [30]. Ref. [31] proposes the Sec-CBSN algorithm, which 
develops different trust calculation methods based on nodal 
roles. Ref. [32] develops an attack-resistant and lightweight 
trust management protocol named ReTrust, which can resist 
attacks through a trust management approach for medical 
sensor networks (MSNs). Ref. [33] presents a proposal named 
TRIP, which aims to quickly and accurately identify malicious 
or selfish nodes spreading false information in vehicular ad hoc 
networks (VANETs). Ref. [34] also proposes a resilient trust 
model, SensorTrust, for hierarchical WSNs. Ref. [24] 
introduces the concept of attribute similarity in finding 
potentially friendly nodes among strangers.  
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Although there is much research on black node attack 
avoidance, there is still much that is worthy of further study. (1) 
The current black hole avoidance strategies mostly affect 
network lifetime. (2) The current black hole avoidance 
strategies are mostly passive acting systems, which affects 
system performance. (3) The trust route mechanism has high 
costs and is difficult to obtain trust, so the guiding significance 
is limited [35, 36].  
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A.  The System Model 
(1) Network model  
 (a) We consider a wireless sensor network consisting of 
sensor nodes that are uniformly and randomly scattered in a 
circular network; the network radius is R , with nodal density 
 , and nodes do not move after being deployed [4, 9]. Upon 
detection of an event, a sensor node will generate messages, 
and those messages must be sent to the sink node [4, 13].  
   (b) We consider that link-level security has been 
established through a common cryptography-based protocol. 
Thus, we consider a link key to be safe unless the adversary 
physically compromises either side of the link [9, 16]. 
(2) The adversaries model 
We consider that black holes are formed by the 
compromised nodes and will unselectively discard all packets 
passed by to prevent data from being sent to the sink [9, 16]. 
The adversary has the ability to compromise some of the nodes. 
However, we consider the adversary to be unable to 
compromise the sink and its neighboring nodes [9, 16]. 
B.  Energy Consumption Model and Related Definitions 
According to the typical energy consumption model [4, 9, 
16], Eq. (1) represents energy consumption for transmitting, 
and Eq. (2) represents energy consumption for receiving. 
elecE  represents the transmitting circuit loss. Both the free 
space ( 2d  power loss) and the multi-path fading (
4d  power 
loss) channel models are used in the model depending on the 
distance between the transmitter and receiver. fs  and amp  
are the respective energy required by power amplification in the 
two models. The energy consumption for receiving an l -bit 
packet is shown in Eq. (2). The above parameter settings are 
shown in Table 1, as adopted from [4, 9, 16]. 
2
0
4
0
      
   
member elec fs
member elec amp
E lE l d if d d
E lE l d if d d


   

  
              (1) 
elecR lElE )(                                                  (2) 
Table 1 network parameters 
Parameter  Value  
Threshold distance (d0) (m)  87  
Sensing range rs (m)  15  
Eelec (nJ/bit)  50  
efs (pJ/bit/m
2
)  10 
eamp (pJ/bit/m
4
)  0.0013  
Initial energy (J)  0.5  
C.  Problem Statement 
 (1) Network lifetime maximization. Network lifetime can 
be defined as the first node die time in the network [4, 9, 16]. 
For 
iE  as the energy consumption for node i , the lifetime 
maximization can be expressed as the following: 
max( ) min  max( )iT E                           (3)  
 (2) The data collection has better security performance 
and strong capability against black hole attacks. 
The main goal of our scheme is to ensure that the nodal 
data safely reach the sink and are not blocked by the black hole. 
Thus, the scheme design goal is to maximize the ratio of 
packets successfully reaching the sink. Consider that the 
number of packets that are required to reach the sink is   and 
that the number of packets that ultimately succeed in reaching 
the sink is m ; the success ratio is 
q m                                                (4) 
Our goal is to maximize the success ratio, that is, max( )q . 
In summary, the optimization goal of this paper is the following 
equation: 
0
max( ) min  max( )
max( ) | 
i
i n
T E
q q m
 
 

 
                                (5) 
IV.  ACTIVE TRUST SCHEME DESIGN 
A.  Overview of the Proposed Scheme 
An overview of the ActiveTrust scheme, which is 
composed of an active detection routing protocol and data 
routing protocol, is shown in Fig. 1. 
 sink
black hole
data route 1
data route 2
data route 3
probe route
A
B
C
 
 Fig. 1: Illustration of the ActiveTrust scheme 
 (1) Active detection routing protocol: A detection route 
refers to a route without data packets whose goal is to convince 
the adversary to launch an attack so the system can identify the 
attack behavior and then mark the black hole location. Thus, the 
system can lower the trust of suspicious nodes and increment 
the trust of nodes in successful routing routes. Through active 
detection routing, nodal trust can be quickly obtained, and it 
can effectively guide the data route in choosing nodes with high 
trust to avoid black holes. The active detection routing protocol 
is shown via the green arrow in Fig. 1. In this scheme, the 
source node randomly selects an undetected neighbor node to 
create an active detection route. Considering that the longest 
detection route length is  , the detection route decreases its 
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length by 1 for every hop until the length is decreased to 0, and 
then the detection route ends. 
(2) Data routing protocol. The data routing refers to the 
process of nodal data routing to the sink. The routing protocol is 
similar to common routing protocols in WSNs [3, 7, 8]; the 
difference is that the route will select a node with high trust for 
the next hop to avoid black holes and thus improve the success 
ratio of reaching the sink. 
The data routing is shown via the black arrow in Fig. 1. The 
routing protocol can adopt an existing routing protocol [7, 12], 
and we take the shortest route protocol as an example. Node a  
in the route will choose the neighbor that is nearer the sink and 
has high trust as the next hop. If there is not a node among all 
neighbors nearer the sink that has trust above the default 
threshold, it will report to the upper node that there is no path 
from a  to the sink. The upper node, working in the same 
manner, will re-select a different node from among its 
neighbors nearer the sink until the data are routed to the sink or 
there is conclusively no path to the sink. 
B.  Active Detection Routing Protocol 
Table 2: Pseudo-code of Algorithm 1 for the active 
detection routing protocol  
 
Algorithm 1: Active Detection Routing Protocol 
1:  Initialization 
2:  For each neighbor node An Do 
3:        Let An.accesTime=Current_time 
4:  End for 
5:  For each node that generates a detection packet, such as node A, Do  
6:      Construct packet P, and do value assignment for   and   
7:      Select B as the next hop which B meets access time is the minimum and  
nearer the sink 
//B is the node that is the longest time undetected and nearer the sink  
8:      Send packet P to node B 
9:  End for 
10:For each node that receives a detection packet, such as node B, Do 
11:      let P. =P. -1, P. =P. -1 
12:      If  =0 then  
13:           Construct feedback packet q, and do value assignment for each part 
14：        Send feedback packet q to the source 
15：   End if 
16:      If p.  0 then  
17:            detection routing continue  
18:      End if 
19:End for 
20:For each node that receives feedback packet q, such as node C, Do 
21:      If q.destination is not itself then 
22:            send q to the source node 
23:      End if 
24:End for 
    
This section details the implementation of the active 
detection routing protocol. The content of the detection routing 
packet can be divided into 6 parts, as shown in Fig. 2: (a) packet 
head; (b) packet type; (c) ID of the source node; (d) maximum 
detection route length; (e) acknowledge returned to the source 
for every   hops; and (f) ID of the packet. 
head  type idsource
 
              Fig. 2: The structure of packets of detection routes 
    The source node selects an undetected node to launch the 
detection route. Once the detection packet is received by nodes, 
the maximum route length   is decreased by 1. After that, if 
  is 0, generate a feedback packet and launch a feedback route 
to the source, and then restore   to the initial value. If   is 
not 0, then continue to select the next hop in the same way; 
otherwise, end the route. The structure of a feedback packet is 
shown in Fig. 3, and it is also composed of 6 parts: (a) packet 
head; (b) packet type; (c) ID of the source node; (d) destination 
node; (e) ID of the detection packet; and (f) ID of the packet. 
head type S-idsource Destination id
  
Fig. 3: The structure of feedback packets of a detection route 
The feedback packet is routed back to the data source; 
because nodes cache the detection route info, the feedback 
packet is able to return back to the source, and the following is 
the algorithm for the detection route protocol. 
C. Calculation of Nodal Trust  
During data routing and detection routing, every node will 
perform a nodal trust calculation to aid in black hole avoidance. 
When node A performs a detection route for node B at time it , 
if the detection data are successfully routed, consider the trust 
of node A to B to be ( )BA it ; otherwise, consider the trust to be 
( )BA it . Considering that A has w  interactions with B during t , 
the detection value order by time is as follows: 
 1 1 2 2( ) | ( ),  ( ) | ( ),  ... ( ) | ( )B B B B B BA A A A A w A wt t t t t t       
( ) | ( )B BA i A it t   refers to the trust value of A to B at it  (if 
data are dropped, then ( )BA it <0; otherwise, ( )
B
A it >0 ). 
Definition 1 (Nodal direction trust): Consider the trust set of 
node A to node B during t  to be: 
  1 1 2 2( ) | ( ),  ( ) | ( ),  ... ( ) | ( )B B B B B BA A A A A w A wt t t t t t       
Then, during period t , the total direction trust of A to B is: 
  
1
( ) | ( ) ( )
,      0
0                                                     ,      0
w
B B B
A A i A i
i
C t t i
w
w
w


   




           
 (6) 
In Eq. (6), ( ) [0,1]i   is an attenuation function to weight 
direction trusts at different times; according to common sense, 
the latest behavior should be given more weight [24], and 
otherwise less weight. The attenuation function is as shown in 
Eq. (7), and   is a decimal less than 1. 
1,
( )
( 1) ( ),  1
i w
i
i i i w

 
   
              (7) 
In the ActiveTrust scheme, the trust calculation should meet 
the following condition. If the node is found to be malicious in 
the latest detection, then its trust should be below the threshold 
 , and the node will not be chosen for later routing. If the 
malicious node returns to the normal node, it needs several 
detections to take it into routing consideration; thus, the 
parameter   should meet the following equation: 
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Theorem 1: Consider that there are at most w  interactions 
involved in the trust computation and that the threshold is  ; 
then, the parameter   should meet the following equation: 
              1 1 1w B BA A                    (8) 
Proof: If the node is shown to be malicious in the latest 
detection, then we can obtain ( )BA it <0; if it was shown to be 
trustable in the previous 1w  detections, then the trust of node 
A to node B must meet the following formula: 
   2 1+  ...+ B B B w BA A A A  
         
     1 1 1w B BA A         
 If there is more than one malicious result in the previous 
1w  detections, the trust should be less than  , thus proved. 
■ 
Inference 1: If the node is shown to be malicious, then when it 
returns to normal, there must be at least   trustable detections, 
and it can be re-considered a trustable node;   meets the 
following: 
1 1 11 ... ... w BA
                         (9) 
Proof: Consider that a node is shown to be trustable in the 
current   detections, that is, BA >0, and malicious in the later 
detection, namely, BA <0. Additionally, in the previous 1w  
detections, the behaviors were all trustable. In this situation,   
is the minimum, and the trust of A to B at this time is as follows: 
1 1 1, ,..., , , ,...,B B B B B w BA A A A A A
             
 
The trust calculation is 
1 1 1... ...B B B B B w BA A A A A A
                        
Considering that ( )BA it =
B
A , the above can be transformed 
into 
1 1 11 ... ... w BA
                  
 
■ 
Definition 2 (Nodal recommendation trust): Node A is the 
trust evaluator, node C is the target of evaluation, and node B is 
a recommender of A. Consider 
B
AC  to be the direction trust of A 
to B and 
C
BC  to be the direction trust of B to C; then, the 
recommendation trust of A to C is 
         
C B C
A A BR C C                                                   (10) 
   For the trust of multiple recommendations, the calculation of 
the recommendation trust from A to B, B to C, etc., until D to E 
is 
       
E B C D E
A A B C DR C C C C                                     (11) 
 Definition 3 (Recommendation trust merging): Consider 
that the recommender set of node A is AR , in ∈ AR  and that 
the recommendation trust of in  to node K is 
,i k
AR ; then, the 
merged trust of A to K is 
  
 11 2
,
,
, ,, ,
  |
...
i
i
i i m m
i n
n k
n kK A
A n A n n k n kn k n k
n A A A A A
R
U u R u
R R R R
 
   
    (12) 
Definition 4 (Comprehensive trust): Comprehensive trust is 
the total trust, which merges the recommendation trust and 
direction trust: 
      , 1
T B B
A B A AC C U                                               (13) 
   The comprehensive trust of a node can be computed as 
follows. After the node launches a detection route, it calculates 
the direction trust according to Eq. (6) for each received 
feedback packet. Through interactions, the node obtains the 
recommendation trust from its neighbors according to Eq. (10), 
and it then calculates the merged trust according to Eq. (12) for 
the multiple-recommendation trust. Finally, it calculates the 
comprehensive trust according to Eq. (13).   
D.  Data Routing Protocol  
The core idea of data routing is that when any node 
receives a data packet, it selects one node from the set of 
candidates nearer the sink whose trust is greater than the preset 
threshold as the next hop. If the node cannot find any such 
appropriate next hop node, it will send a feedback failure to the 
upper node, and the upper node will re-calculate the unselected 
node set and select the node with the largest trust as the next 
hop; similarly, if it cannot find any such appropriate next hop, it 
sends a feedback failure to its upper node. The protocol is as 
follows: 
Table 3: Pseudo-code of Algorithm 2 for data routing 
protocol 
 
Algorithm 2: Data Routing Protocol  
1:  For each node that generates or receives a data packet, such as node A, Do  
2:        select B as the next hop such that B has never been selected in this data 
routing process, has the largest trust and is nearer the sink 
4:      If A finds such node, for instance, node B 
5:             Send data packet P to node B 
6:             If node B is the sink then 
7:                   this data routing procession is completed 
8:             End if 
9：   Else  
10:           Send failure feedback to the upper node, such as node C 
11:    End if   
12:End for 
13:For each node that receives failure feedback, such as node B, Do 
14:    Repeat step 2 to step 11 
15:End for  
    
E. The Number of Active Detection Routes 
First, we analyze the energy consumption at different 
distances from the sink. As in theorem 1 of Ref. [16], consider 
the network radius to be R , the nodal transmission radius to be 
r , and the event generation rate to be  ; the shortest route 
path protocol is deployed such that the nodal distance to the 
sink is l , l = hr x . The number of data packets undertaken by 
this node is thus as follows: 
     1 1 2ld z z z r l                                 (14) 
| z  is an integer that makes l zr  just smaller than R         
From Eq. (14), the energy consumption depends on the 
undertaken data amount. Thus, this paper considers the nodal 
data amount to represent the nodal load. Because the network 
lifetime depends on the node that has the highest energy 
consumption, we consider the maximum nodal data load to be 
ActiveTrust: Secure and Trustable Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks  
 
6 
maxd  and the energy consumption to be max ud e  and thus 
observe that there is remaining energy for nodes whose data 
load is smaller than 
maxd ; then, we can fully use the remaining 
energy to construct detection routes. For the node whose 
distance to the sink is l , the remaining energy of the node is 
max( )l ud d e , which can be used for detection. If the distance of 
an active detection route is measured by hops, then the 
available nodal hops of the active detection route is as follows: 
Theorem 2: If the nodal distance to the sink is l , then the 
maximum detection hops that can be achieved by its residue 
energy is l =  max 2 2 1( )(1 ) (1 / )ld d      , where 1  is 
the ratio of data packet length to detection packet length and 2  
is the ratio of data packet length to head packet length. 
Proof: According to Eq. (14), for a node whose distance to the 
sink is l , its data load is      1 1 2ld z z z r l     . The 
maximum nodal data load is      max min1 1 2d z z z r l     . 
Thus, the residue energy of this node is 
max( )l pd d e , where pe  
denotes the energy consumption for sending and receiving a 
unit data packet. Considering that the energy consumption for 
sending and receiving one bit data is ue , pe = ue  because   is 
the unit packet length,  = h b  , h  is the packet head length, 
and b  is the packet body length. Then, the available residue 
energy is max( ) ( )l u h bd d e     because the energy 
consumption for sending and receiving one detection packet is 
( )u h be   , where h  is the head packet length of the 
detection packet and b  is the body packet length. Consider 
h  to equal h , namely, h = h , 1b b   , b = 2 h  . 
    Then, the active detection route hops that can be achieved by 
the nodal residue energy is 
 max( ) ( ) ( )l l u h b u h bd d e e        

l =  max 2 2 1( )(1 ) (1 / )ld d     
                             
■ 
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Fig. 4 The maximum detection hops 
afforded by the residue energy of nodes  
(different 1k , 2k ) 
Fig. 5 The maximum detection hops 
afforded by the residue energy of 
nodes (different r ) 
Figs. 4 and 5 provide the maximum detection hops 
afforded by the residue energy of nodes with different distances 
from the sink. As seen, there is much residue energy in 
non-hotspots because the detection packet length is small; in a 
network with radius R =500 m, the detection hops can number 
in the hundreds, which shows that the network has sufficient 
energy to process detection routes without affecting the 
network lifetime.  
Theorem 3: If the detection route length is   hops and one 
detection feedback packet is returned to the detection source 
every   (   ) hops, then the total number of detection 
hops in this route is 
,
1
2
i
k
k   

     | i                                    (15) 
Proof: Because the detection data route length is   hops, the 
number of data route hops is  . One detection feedback is 
returned every   hops for a route with length  , and 
feedback is returned at  , 2 ,... i , , where i  . The 
number of hops for each returned feedback is  , 2 ,... i , ; 
the number of returned packet hops is thus 
1
i
k
k 

 . Because 
the route length is   and because it is possible for part of the 
route to be unable to be created or for returned packets to be 
unable to reach the detection source due to malicious nodes, the 
maximum number of detection hops is 
1
2
i
k
k 

 . 
                                                                              ■ 
In summary, the number of detection routes that can be 
created by residue energy can be found via Inference 2.  
Inference 2: For a node whose distance to the sink is l , where 
the detection route length is   hops and one detection 
feedback packet is returned to the detection source every   
(  ) hops, the number of routes created by the residue 
energy is 
,  =
max 2
12 1
( )(1 )
2
(1 / )
i
l
k
d d
k

 
  
    
   
   
  | i


 
  
 
    
(16) 
Proof: According to theorem 2, for a node at a distance l  from 
the sink, the maximum detection hops that can be achieved by 
its residue energy is l =  max 2 2 1( )(1 ) (1 / )ld d      ; 
theorem 3 shows the maximum number of detection hops to be 
1
2
i
k
k 

 . Thus, the number of detection routes can be 
obtained by dividing these two values.                                           ■ 
Inference 3: The ActiveTrust scheme has the same network 
lifetime as do schemes without any security strategy. 
Proof: The ActiveTrust scheme uses residue energy to 
construct detection routes; this construction energy 
consumption will not make the nodal energy consumption 
larger than maxd , and thus, its lifetime is still  = maxinitE d . 
                                                    ■ 
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Fig. 6 The number of probing routes 
that can be created 
Fig. 7 Indirection trust among nodes 
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Fig. 6 shows, in a network with radius R =500 m, the 
number of probing routes that can be created by residue energy 
in non-hotspots under detection route lengths of 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
As seen, the residue energy can support at least 7 detection 
routes. Performance Analysis of the ActiveTrust Scheme 
F. Analysis of the Successful Routing Probability  
Theorem 3: Considering that the nodal degree is d , after one 
round of a detection route whose length (number of hops) is x , 
the number of nodes that have direction trust is dm , the number 
of nodes that have a minimum indirection trust is inm , and the 
number of nodes that cannot obtain trust is nom ; they are 
 1 (1 ) ,  (1 ) ,  ( )  |xd in no dm m P d m d m P m d         (17)  
where 
3
0                            2  | (1 ) 2
2
( )!( )! 3
   2   | (1 ) 2
2!( 2 )!
d
p if v d
v v
p if v d m d
v
 

 
 
 

    


            
 
Proof: Considering that the malicious node ratio is  , the 
detection route length (number of hops) is x , though during the 
routing, it may end early due to a black hole. Then, for route 
length x , the actual average route length is calculated as 
follows: 
The probability of encountering a black hole at the first time 
is  , and the probability of not encountering one until the 
second time is (1 )  ; thus, the probability of not 
encountering one until the i th time is 1(1 )i  . 
Thus, the actual average route length is 
1 12(1 ) ... (1 ) ... (1 )i xdm i x      
           (18) 
After complex processing, the above equation can be 
simplified into:  1 (1 )xdm     . 
If each node processes one round of detection with length 
x , then from the average, it is equivalent to for each node to 
process dm  detection routes to its neighbors; thus, the number 
of nodes with direction trust is dm . 
For indirection trust, as shown in Fig. 7, node A and node B 
have a minimum number of common neighbors; then, the 
indirection trust probability is the minimum it can be calculated 
as follows: 
The number of common nodes of A and B is the number of 
nodes within the same transmission radius. The area of this 
region is 2 2
3 1
2( 3 )
2 2
r r  = 2 2
2 3
3 2
r r  . 
The number of nodes in this region is 
 2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 3
( )
3 23 2
r r r r d r   
 
    
 
. 
Except for A and B, the number of common neighbors 
is  =
2 3
( ) 2
3 2
d

  . 
Node A processed dm  detections, and then the number 
of detections for the common neighbors is    
 =
2 3
( ) 2
3 2
dd m d

 
   
 
; this also applies to node B. The 
probabilities of these two sets are completely different, that is, 
0                                           2
. ( )!( )!
   2
!( 2 )!.
v v
v
v v
p if v
c c v v
p if v
vc c
 
 

 

 

 

 
   
 
Therefore, the probability that A cannot obtain the 
indirection trust of B is P , A has d  neighbors, among which 
there are dm  nodes that can obtain direction trust and 
inm = (1 )P d  nodes that can obtain indirection trust, and the 
number of nodes that cannot obtain trust is 
( )  |no dm d m P m d   . 
■ 
Theorem 4: If only direction trust is considered, and the 
number of such nodes is dm , then the success rate for data 
packets sent to the sink by nodes that are k  hops away is  
       
3 1
3 1 1
(1 )          
(1 )      d
k d k
d d
mk k
d d
if m d
if m d
 
 

 
   

  
                               (19) 
Proof: First, calculate the success rate of any of node A’s 
one-hop transmissions. A failed transmission means that node 
A finds that all of the detected nodes whose hops smaller than 
itself are black holes; the detected nodes cannot be selected, and 
A must select from the undetected nodes. If the selected 
undetected node is a black hole, the transmission fails. 
Thus, the failure probability is as follows. There are 3 states 
for node A, that is, nodes whose hops are larger than, the same 
as and smaller than A’s. For the nodal degree d , the number of 
nodes whose hops are smaller than A’s is 3d , and there are 
3dm  detections for these smaller nodes, with a total of dm  
detections. 
If dm d , then all of the neighbors of node A can be 
detected; then, only if all of the next hop nodes are black nodes 
can the data transmission fail; the probability of this situation is 
1 =
3d . 
If dm d , the black node probability for each detection 
is 
3dm , and the black node probability when choosing the next 
hop is 
3 1dm  ; that is, the failure probability is 1 =
3 1dm  . 
Therefore, for a node at k  hops from the sink, if data are 
sent k  hops and the last hop is not a black node, then the 
success transmission probability for each hop after that is 
3 1
3 1 1
(1 )          
(1 )      d
k d k
d d
mk k
d d
if m d
if m d
 
 

 
   

  
 
■ 
Inference 4: Considering that the number of nodes with 
direction trust is dm  and that the number of nodes with 
indirection trust is inm , the success ratio for nodes at k  hops 
from the sink is 
3 1
( ) 3 1 1
(1 )                | |
(1 )      | |d in
k d k
di d in
m mk k
di d in
if m m d
if m m d
 
 

  
    

   
         (20) 
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Proof: Because the indirection trust is within a range of two 
hops, the black node can be identified with indirection trust, 
and thus the number of recognizable nodes is the union of 
direction and indirection nodes, that is, | |d inm m ; therefore, 
Inference 4 can be inferred from Theorem 4. 
■ 
Theorem 5: If only direction trust nodes are considered, and 
the number of such nodes is dm , then, for a network whose 
R hr , the success ratio is  
d =
 
 
3 1 2
2
3 1 1 2
2
(2 1)(1 )        
(2 1)(1 )    
h
d k
k
h
y k
k
k h if y d
k h if y d




 


  


   



             (21) 
Proof: Theorem 4 gives the success probability k
d  for nodes 
at k  hops from the sink because the number of such nodes at 
k  hops is  2 2( ) (( 1) )kr k r    = 2(2 1)k r  . 
Then, the number of nodes whose data successfully reaches 
the sink is kS =
2(2 1) kdk r   
Because there is no black node within a one-hop range, the 
total number of packets that successfully arrive at the sink is 
 2
2
(2 1)
h
k
total d
k
S k r 

  =
 
 
2 3 1
2
3 12 1
2
(2 1)(1 )           
(2 1)(1 )      d
h
d k
k
h
m k
d
k
r k if y d
r k if m d
  
  


 


  


   



 
and the number of packets sent in the entire network is 
2( )hr . Thus, theorem 5 can be proved.  
■ 
Fig. 8 shows the total data route success ratio with our 
scheme (only one detection route with a length  =5). As seen, 
our scheme has a much higher total success ratio than does the 
shortest routing scheme. 
Inference 5:  Considering that the number of nodes with 
direction trust is dm  and that the number of nodes with 
indirection trust is inm  for a network whose R hr , the 
successful data transmission ratio in our scheme is 
 
 
3 1 2
2
 | | 3 1 1 2
2
(2 1)(1 )                | |
(2 1)(1 )      | |d in
h
d k
d in
k
di h
m m k
d in
k
k h if m m d
k h if m m d





  


   

 
    



  
(22) 
Proof: Similar to inference 4, inference 5 can be inferred from 
theorem 3. 
■ 
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Fig. 8 Total data route success ratio 
Fig. 9 Required network scale that makes 
the number of detected nodes larger than 
the nodal degree without affecting the 
network lifetime 
According to theorems 3-5, if the number of direction 
detection nodes is larger than the nodal degree, which means 
that all neighbors are detected and all neighbor trust is obtained, 
only a scenario in which all neighbors are black nodes can 
cause the transmission to fail. In fact, if this happens, no 
scheme can solve this problem because all paths to the sink are 
blocked by black nodes. Therefore, the situation in which the 
number of detected nodes equals the nodal degree is optimal. In 
the following, we analyze whether this ideal situation can be 
achieved in WSNs.  
Theorem 6: For nodal degree d  and feedback that is returned 
hop-by-hop in the detection route, if the network scale meets 
the following equation, the number of detected nodes can be 
larger than the nodal degree without affecting the network 
lifetime, thereby achieving maximum security. 
2 1
2
(1 / )3(1 (1 ) 6 ) 1
4 (1 ) 2
x d
h
  
 
  
 

                   (23) 
Proof: (1) The energy consumption is the highest in the 1st ring, 
and the second highest is the 2nd ring. Thus, if the energy can 
afford the 2nd ring to detect nodes  d , then other rings can 
ensure that the detected nodes  d . The data load in the 1st ring 
is 
2 2h r  , and there are 2r   nodes in the 1st ring; then, the 
data load for each node is  2 2 2h r r    = 2h . Considering 
that the energy consumption for sending a unit data packet is ue , 
the energy consumption in the 1st ring is 2 uh e . 
There are 
2 2 22 r r    = 23 r   nodes in the 2nd ring, 
and the data load is (
2 2 2h r r    ), so the data load for each 
node is  2 2 2 23h r r r      =  2 1 3uh e ; thus, the 
remaining energy in the 2nd ring compared with that in the 1st 
ring is 2 uh e -  2 1 3uh e
 
=  22 1 3uh e . pe  is the energy 
consumption for a detection packet, so 
2 2 1(1 ) (1 / )ue      pe  can be used for detection packets, 
and the number of detection packets is 
   2 2 2 12 1 3 (1 ) (1 / )h       
If the detection route length is x , then the number of 
nodes that can be detected is  1 (1 )xdm     . If dm  d , 
then there should be at least min dn d m  detection routes. 
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 1 (1 ) ,  (1 ) ,  ( )  |xd in no dm m P d m d m P m d        
For a detection route with length dm , the number of detection 
packets needed is  
1+2+3…+ dm + dm =  2 3 2d dm m  
The total number of needed detection packets is 
 2min 3 2d dn m m =    (1 (1 ) 6 ) 2x d      
because 
       2 2 2 12 1 3 (1 ) (1 / ) (1 (1 ) 6 ) 2xh d                  
 h > 2 1
2
(1 / )3(1 (1 ) 6 ) 1
4 (1 ) 2
x d
h
  
 
  
 

 
■ 
As seen in Fig. 9, if the network scale is only 7 hops with 
a nodal degree of 30, the residue energy in non-hotspots region 
can process a sufficient number of detection routes in one 
round of data collection to detect all neighbors’ trust without 
affecting the network lifetime. This state achieves the best 
security. 
Theorem 7: For nodes that are k  hops away from the sink, the 
success ratio of our scheme when the shortest route is adopted 
is  
  
       
(1 ) (1 )k k kk d                                             (24) 
Proof: For a black node ratio in the network of   and for 
nodes that are k  hops away from the sink because nodes are 
randomly selected, the probability of a black node is the same 
as the black node ratio in the network, that is,  , for each hop 
selection. The last hop is not a black node; thus, with the 
shortest route scheme, the probability of all non-black nodes 
being selected after k  hops is 1(1 )k  , and the ratio of our 
scheme to the shortest route scheme is 
(1 ) (1 )k k kk d       
■ 
Theorem 8: In a network whose R hr , the success ratio of 
our scheme to the shortest route is 
 2 1
2
(2 1)(1 )
h
k
d
k
h k   

                             (25) 
Proof: The above theorems have proved that in the shortest 
route scheme, the success probability of data at k  hops to the 
sink is 
1(1 )k  . In the network, the number of nodes that are 
k  hops from the sink is 
  2 2 2( ) (( 1) ) (2 1)kr k r k r        
    Thus, in the shortest route scheme, the number of successful 
data packets at k  hops to the sink is 
  
2 1(2 1) (1 )kkS k r 
    
There is no black node in the 1st ring; thus, in the entire 
network, the number of packets to the sink is 
 2 1
2
(2 1) (1 )
h
k
total
k
S k r  

    
There are 
2( )hr  nodes in the network, so the packet 
success ratio in the entire network is  
 
   2 1 1
2 2
2 2
(2 1)(1 ) (2 1)(1 )
( )
h h
k k
k k
r k k
hr h
   

 
 
   

 
 
Therefore, the packet success ratio of our scheme to the 
shortest route scheme is 
 2 1
2
(2 1)(1 )
h
k
d
k
h k   

     
■ 
Figs. 10 and 11 show the improved ratio of our scheme to 
the shortest route scheme. As seen, as the distance from the sink 
increases, more hops are required for data to be transmitted to 
the sink, so the success ratio in the shortest route scheme is low; 
however, our scheme is based on the detected nodal trust, and 
the success probability is higher because of the selection of 
high trust nodes. If the black node ratio is higher, it is more 
improved by our scheme (up to 10 times more), thus confirming 
the effectiveness of our scheme (see Figs. 10 and 11). 
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Fig. 10 Improved ratio of our scheme to 
the shortest route scheme 
Fig. 11 Total improved ratio of our 
scheme to the shortest route scheme 
G.  Analysis of the Energy Efficiency 
This section analyzes the energy efficiency performance 
of our scheme and compares it to other schemes. 
Theorem 9: If each node, except for nodes in the 1st ring, 
processes an  detection routes with length x , then the energy 
efficiency is 
 =    
2
2 21
2 1
3 1 (1 )
(2 1)
2
kh
d d
d p p u
k
m m
n e e k h e h


     
   
   

 
(26) 
|
3 1 3
1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
min , , , |d
x x
n d
d a dn n d m
 
  
 
       
 
 
Proof: According to theorem 1, the number of nodes whose 
direction trust can be obtained in one detection route with 
length x  is  1 (1 )xdm      1 (1 )x   ; after an  
detection routes, the number of nodes whose direction trust can 
be obtained is an =   min 1 (1 ) ,xan d   . Theorem 4 
proved that for a detection route with length dm , the number 
of detection packets is  2 3 2d dm m ; thus, for an  detection 
routes, the number of detection packets needed is 
an  2 3 2d dm m . Theorem 2 proved that the number of nodes 
whose direction trust is available is dn  and that the probability 
of data failure for the next hop is 
3 1 3
1 |
dn d   . Therefore, 
for nodes that are k  hops from the sink, the number of average 
data route hops is  1 11 (1 )k   . 
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Thus, the energy consumption of a node that is k  hops 
from the sink is 
dn    2 1 13 2 1 (1 )kd d d p un m m e e     pe . 
Because there are 
2(2 1)k r   nodes that are k  hops 
from the sink, the total energy consumption is 
 
2
21
2 1
3 1 (1 )
(2 1)
2
kh
d d
d p p
k
m m
n e e k r



     
   
   
  
an the highest energy consumption is 2 uh e . Then, the 
energy efficiency of our scheme is  
 =    
2
2 21
2 1
3 1 (1 )
(2 1)
2
kh
d d
d p p u
k
m m
n e e k h e h


     
   
   
   
■ 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experimental platform adopted in this paper is 
OMNET++ [37]. Unless otherwise noted, the experiments use 
the following settings. The network radius R =500 m, there are 
a total of 1000 nodes in the network, among which there are 
300 black nodes, nodes are randomly and uniformly deployed, 
and the sink is at the network’s center.  
A. Experimental Results of Node Trust 
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Fig. 12. The number of detected black 
nodes as the network operates 
Fig. 13. The number of detected good 
nodes as the network operates 
The experimental scene in Fig. 12 is such that in each data 
collection round, each node initiates one detection route with a 
length of 5. As seen, as the network runs, i.e., as more detection 
routes are performed, the number of black nodes detected 
grows quickly; when the number of deployed black nodes is 
300, 400 and 500, the time needed to detect them all is, 
respectively, 5, 9 and 12 rounds, which shows that the 
ActiveTrust scheme can quickly detect malicious nodes within 
only several detections. Fig. 13 shows the number of detected 
good nodes as the network runs in the same experimental scene 
as in Fig. 12; as seen, after only 4 rounds, our ActiveTrust 
scheme has detected all of the good nodes because in the data 
routing, it needs only one good downstream node to route the 
next hop; this indicates that, according to our scheme, the route 
can be reliable and have a high success probability.     
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Fig. 14. The number of detected 
black nodes as the network 
operates 
Fig. 15. The number of detected 
nodes in one data collection round 
under different numbers of detection 
routes 
Fig. 14 shows the number of black nodes detected in each 
data collection with twice detecting. As seen, compared with 
once detecting, the black node detection speed doubles, and all 
black nodes can be detected in, at most, 7 rounds. The 
experiment in Fig. 15 further illustrates this problem, which 
shows that the more detection routes there are in one data 
collection round, the less time is needed to detect all of the 
black nodes. This indicates that the black nodes can be more 
quickly detected as the detection grows, which improves 
network security. According to inference 2, the residue energy 
in non-hotspots can afford 7 times (or even more than 10 times) 
detecting; if all of the residue energy is used to construct 
detection routes, the system can detect almost all of the black 
nodes in at most two data collection rounds, which fully verifies 
the fast recognition ability of our scheme. 
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Fig. 16. Average trust of black 
nodes as the network operates 
Fig. 17. Average trust of good nodes 
as the network operates 
    The experimental scene in Figs. 16 and 17 deploys 1000 
nodes in a network with 400 black nodes. In each data 
collection round, each node creates detection once. As seen, the 
average trust of black nodes declines as the network operates, 
whereas that of good nodes increases. 
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Fig. 18. The number of detected 
black nodes under different nodal 
densities  
Fig. 19. The number of detected good 
nodes under different nodal densities  
Figs. 18 and 19 show the number of detected black nodes 
or good nodes after two rounds of data collection when each 
node detects once in each round for a network of 1000, 1100, 
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1200, 1300, 1400, and 1500 nodes with 300, 400, and 500 black 
nodes. As seen from Fig. 18, for a situation with 300 black 
nodes and a 90% detected black node ratio, the increase in the 
number of detected black nodes is smaller as the nodal density 
increases, but if there are 500 black nodes, this increase is more 
obvious, which shows that our scheme has good performance in 
networks with greater nodal density. In Fig. 19, the number of 
detected good nodes grows as the nodal density increases, 
which shows that in networks with greater nodal density, the 
success route probability increases, which matches the actual 
situation. 
B. Experimental Results of Energy Consumption  
Fig. 20 shows a 3-d map of energy consumption for each 
node detecting three times in one data collection round in a 
network with R =400 m and 400 black nodes from a total of 
1000 nodes. As seen from Fig. 21, because the detection energy 
consumption is basically balancing shared, except the detection 
energy consumption near the sink is very low (to decrease the 
energy consumption in hotspots), the energy consumption is 
balanced in other regions; as the detection routes increase, the 
detection energy consumption increases. 
Because the data success route probability is low and most 
routes are blocked by black nodes in the shortest route scheme, 
the sink only receives a few data packets. Therefore, in this 
situation, the energy consumption is more balanced (see Fig. 
22). In the ActiveTrust scheme, because the data success route 
rate is higher, the energy consumption near the sink is higher; 
although there is detection energy consumption in non-hotspots, 
the detection energy consumption is low compared with data 
collection energy consumption, so the energy consumption 
near the sink is higher than that in other regions. A 3-d map of 
the energy consumption is shown in Fig. 23, which also 
indicates that there is sufficient energy remaining for detection.  
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Fig. 20 Energy consumption for 
each node detecting three times in 
one data collection round 
Fig. 21 Detection energy 
consumption at different distances 
from the sink 
  
Fig. 22. Energy consumption with 
the shortest routing scheme 
Fig. 23 Detection energy 
consumption at different distances 
from the sink 
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Fig. 24. Energy consumption 
comparison under different 
schemes 
Fig. 25. Energy consumption for unit 
success under different schemes 
Fig. 24 shows the energy consumption at different 
distances from the sink after one data collection round. As seen, 
with the shortest routing, the energy consumption is less, as 
explained previously. With multi-path routing, i.e., one data 
packet is sent to the sink via different paths to improve the 
success rate, more packets reach the sink, and the energy 
consumption is proportional to the number of paths, i.e., the 
more paths there are, the higher the energy consumption is and 
the higher the success rate is for data arriving at the sink. 
Although the success rate increases as the number of paths 
grows, there are some problems. (1) The success rate is not 
high; for instance, if the success rate for each path is 20%, then 
even if 10 paths are created, the success rate does not reach 90%. 
(2) Even if a certain success rate is achieved, the network 
lifetime is affected. Therefore, in our scheme, by constructing 
light active detection routes, malicious nodes can be detected 
without affecting the network lifetime, which also improves the 
success rate with good performance. 
Fig. 25 shows the ratio of nodal energy consumption to 
the number of packets that are successfully routed to the sink. 
This ratio reflects that with the same energy consumption, the 
number of successful packet in different schemes does, in fact, 
indicate the network energy efficiency. As seen, our scheme 
can improve the energy efficiency by more than 2 times 
compared with that of previous researches which is consistent 
with theorem 9.  
C. Comparison of the Probability of Success Routing 
The experimental scene in Fig. 26 is a network with 
R =400 m and 400 black nodes from a total of 1000 nodes, 
where each node only detects once. As seen from Fig. 26, as the 
network runs under our scheme, the probability of successful 
routing is almost 100% after 7 data collection rounds. For the 
shortest routing, this probability is not even 15%. With 
multi-path routing, it is only approximately 60% with 4 paths 
simultaneously. Moreover, in this black node avoidance 
scheme, no matter how long the network runs, the probability 
of successful routing will never increase. The trust-based 
routing is similar to the TARF scheme [30], in which the next 
hop is selected based on the trust of the node. Thus, the 
probability of successful routing will increase with time. 
However, the scheme does not detect nodes’ trust actively, so 
its probability of successful routing is lower than that of the 
proposed scheme. Fig. 27 shows the probability of successful 
routing under different numbers of black nodes. As seen, our 
scheme is significantly better than multi-path routing. Fig. 28 
shows the improvement of our scheme compared with other 
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schemes; as seen, our scheme is better than other schemes. 
When the network runs a short time, the successful routing 
probability is improved from 1.5 times to 6 times. Fig. 29 
shows the improvement of our scheme compared with other 
schemes under different numbers of black nodes. As seen, it is 
improved by more than 3 times compared with the shortest 
routing and is higher than multi-path routing schemes and 
trust-based routing.  
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Fig. 26. The probability of 
successful routing as the network 
operates    
Fig. 27. The probability of successful 
routing under different numbers of 
black nodes  
Fig. 30 shows the probability of successful routing as the 
network runs under the ActiveTrust scheme; as seen, even in 
the situation where there is only one detection in one data 
collection round, the probability can be almost 100% after 
several data collection rounds. Fig. 31 shows the probability of 
successful routing in one data collection round with one, two 
and three detections. As seen, if the detection routing path is 3, 
after only 3 rounds, the probability can be almost 100%, which 
verifies the high probability of successful routing in our 
scheme. 
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Fig. 28 Ratio of successful routing 
with different schemes as the 
network operates    
Fig. 29 Ratio of successful routing 
with different schemes under 
different numbers of black nodes 
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Fig. 30 The probability of 
successful routing 
Fig. 31 The probability of successful 
routing under different numbers of 
detection routing paths in one data 
collection round. 
Fig. 32 shows the probability of successful routing under 
different nodal densities. As seen, when the nodal density 
grows, the nodal degree grows, and the probability of 
successful routing increases. The reason is that as the nodal 
density grows, the nodal degree grows, and then there are more 
detected trustable nodes after detection, that is, there are more 
nodes for the next hop, and the probability of successful routing 
thus increases. Fig. 33 shows the probability of successful 
routing as the nodal transmission radius r  grows; as seen, the 
probability of successful routing is also increased. The reason is 
that, as r  grows, the nodal density grows, which is the same as 
found in the experiment of Fig. 32. 
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Fig. 32. The probability of 
successful routing under different 
nodal densities       
Fig. 33. The probability of successful 
routing under different nodal 
transmission radiuses r  
  Figs. 34 and 35 give the probability of successful routing of 
the ActiveTrust scheme for different BLAs. In the experiment, 
the black hole attack refers to the malicious attack in which all 
data that attempt to pass by are dropped. However, the 
Denial-of-Service Attack refers to the attack in which data are 
dropped intermittently [35, 36], thus making it difficult to resist 
this attack. The select forward attack is one of the most 
intelligent attacks and can drop data selectively [6]. It can be 
seen from Figs. 34 and 35 that the ActiveTrust scheme has 
positive effects on the different impacts of BLAs. 
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Fig. 34. The probability of 
successful routing for different 
BLAs    
Fig. 35. The probability of successful 
routing under different numbers of 
black nodes for different BLAs 
VI. CONCLUSION 
     In this paper, we have proposed a novel security and trust 
routing scheme based on active detection, and it has the 
following excellent properties: (1) High successful routing 
probability, security and scalability. The ActiveTrust scheme 
can quickly detect the nodal trust and then avoid suspicious 
nodes to quickly achieve a nearly 100% successful routing 
probability. (2) High energy efficiency. The ActiveTrust 
scheme fully uses residue energy to construct multiple 
detection routes. The theoretical analysis and experimental 
results have shown that our scheme improves the successful 
routing probability by more than 3 times, up to 10 times in 
some cases. Further, our scheme improves both the energy 
efficiency and the network security performance. It has 
important significance for wireless sensor network security. 
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